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## How Much Does Pragmatics Help to Contrast the Meaning of Hearsay Adverbs? (Part 2)

### Abstract

The present study aims at differentiating between semantically-coded and pragmatically-conditioned meaning components of Polish and German sentence adverbs whose meaning is conventionally associated with hearsay ( $\approx$  Eng. *allegedly*, *reportedly*, *supposedly*). In the current part of the study, we argue why our objective should be reached on the basis of Generalized Conversational Implicatures (GCIs), and we show which particular communicative principles distinguished in Neo-Gricean frameworks can sensibly be considered as triggers of GCIs that evoke ‘epistemic overtones’ in the use of hearsay adverbs. We differentiate between GCIs which work for all relevant adverbs and implicatures which only apply to more individual properties of hearsay adverbs on more specific, “deeper” levels of their meaning structure. In accordance with this more descriptive task, we discuss general issues concerning presumable hierarchies of factors that influence (trigger or cancel) epistemic implicatures in the usage of lexical markers of information source. We argue that many discourse properties on the semantics-pragmatics interface which are characteristic of grammatical evidentials also hold true for lexical markers of information source.

### Keywords

Polish, German, reportive evidentiality, sentence adverbs, Generalized Conversational Implicatures, coded vs. inferred meaning

### Streszczenie

Artykuł stanowi próbę rozróżnienia zakodowanych semantycznie oraz uwarunkowanych pragmatycznie komponentów znaczenia polskich i niemieckich reportatywnych przysłówków zdaniowych (ang. *allegedly*, *reportedly*, *supposedly*). W niniejszej, drugiej części artykułu na podstawie teorii Uogólnionych Implikatur Konwersacyjnych (Generalized Conversational Implicatures, GCI) pokazujemy, w jaki sposób mechanizmy komunikacyjne przyjęte w ujęciach neo-Griceńskich prowadzą do GCI nadających przysłówkom reportatywnym zabarwienie epistemiczne. Rozróżniamy przy tym GCI towarzyszące użyciu wszystkich przysłówków reportatywnych oraz te implikatury, które wiążą się z ich

indywidualnymi cechami na głębszym poziomie struktury znaczeniowej. Następnie poruszamy problem ogólniejszy, dotyczący przypuszczalnych hierarchii czynników, które wywołują (lub znoszą) implikatury epistemiczne u jednostek leksykalnych wyrażających źródło informacji. Uważamy, że jednostki te wykazują na poziomie dyskursu wiele właściwości dotyczących styku semantyki i pragmatyki, które dotychczas przypisywano tylko gramatycznym eksponentom ewidencjalności.

#### Słowa kluczowe

język polski, język niemiecki, ewidencjalność reportatywna, przysłówki sentencjalne, uogólnione implikatury konwersacyjne, znaczenie zakodowane vs. znaczenie wywnioskowane

In the first part of this paper published in the preceding issue of this journal (Wiemer and Socka 2017), we presented a systematic corpus study of hearsay adverbs in Polish and German providing the empirical basis for the conclusions that we want to draw in this part.

### 3. A proposal of how to explain the facts

How can we make sense of the facts assembled in Wiemer and Socka (2017: Section 2.2)? We are first going to justify why we think that the relation between reportive justification and epistemic judgment can best be characterized as resulting from Generalized Conversational Implicature. Probably, another name for this property is ‘default’, in the same way as, in Wiemer and Socka (2017: Section 2.2.2), we pointed out origo-exclusiveness as a feature of *rzekomo* (in distinction to other Polish ALLEGEDLY-units) that, on the one hand, arises independently of the specific context and, on the other hand, can be canceled by other factors. Apart from this individual feature of *rzekomo*, we are making the more general claim that only the evidential (reportive) component is inherent to all ALLEGEDLY-units in Polish and German, while epistemic overtones result from an interaction of this stable (i.e. coded) meaning with some general assumptions about the way communication works (3.1). Then we try to establish, on Neo-Gricean grounds, which specific kind of implicature is responsible for the assumed mechanism (3.2), and we discuss some more far-reaching consequences of this analysis of different kinds of implicatures for the semantic-pragmatics interface of evidential markers (3.3).

#### 3.1. Epistemic overtones as the result of Generalized Conversational Implicatures

Our own proposal amounts to ascribing the epistemic overtones in the examined units the status of Generalized Conversational Implicatures (henceforth GCI). According to Levinson (2000: 16), GCIs differ from Particularized Conversational Implicatures in the following way:

- [1] a) An implicature I from utterance U is particularized iff U implicates I only by virtue of specific contextual assumptions that would not invariably or even normally obtain.  
 b) An implicature I is generalized iff U implicates I unless there are unusual specific contextual assumptions that defeat it.

GCIIs take place as preferred, or default, interpretations that are canceled (or blocked) only under some specific conditions. GCIIs are associated with utterance-type meanings, which Levinson postulates to be a third kind of meaning because they cannot be reduced to either sentence-type-meaning or utterance-token-meaning, but rather belong to “a level of **systematic pragmatic inference** not based on direct computations about speaker-intentions but on **general expectations about how language is normally used**” (Levinson 2000: 20; emphasis added, BW/AS).

Among other things, the observations made in Wiemer and Socka (2017: Section 2.2) show that, on the one hand, **any** of the reportive adverbs (a) easily triggers (or: is compatible with) an implicature of negative epistemic assessment, but, on the other hand, (b) any of these units allows this implicature to be canceled. Admittedly, the contextual conditions on which this occurs differ. They are obviously most specific for Pol. *rzekomo* and, probably, Germ. *angeblich*. But this difference can be captured by introducing defaults (or, conversely, defeatability) of different strength. We could claim that for Pol. *rzekomo* the default of implicating negative epistemic judgment is stronger than for *jakoby* and *podobno*. How ‘epistemic strength’ might be reliably assigned and used as a falsifiable comparative concept on any sort of scale is an issue that, at present, we do not want, and do not need, to decide upon. What is important here is that news reports about purported violations of laws (and similar kinds of discourse) readily supply contexts that defeat this implicature (= default assumption).

For the same reason, we can justify why the component of epistemic judgment for, e.g., *rzekomo* cannot be characterized as Conventional Implicature. If it could, we would expect this component to be neither calculable, nor cancelable (so that it would have to be stipulated in the adverb’s lexical entry as its individual feature). But as we saw, it can be canceled even in *rzekomo*, so that this unit basically behaves like the other reportive adverbs, irrespective of whatever strength of default we might wish to assign to it.

Apart from that, it has been claimed that conversational implicatures tend to be universal, whereas conventional ones tend not to be universal. This leaves us with the question of how universal (i.e. culture-independent) conversational implicatures characteristic of reportive adverbs (or other propositional modifiers) are, regardless of which kind of principle is responsible for the GCI (see 3.2). We will return to this issue in section 4.

## 3.2. Which specific kind of GCI is at work?

Now we are going to discuss which mechanism causes the supposed machinery on the lexicon-pragmatics interface to work. For this purpose, we rely on a Neo-Gricean approach defended and summarized in Huang (2007).

### 3.2.1. Principles based on the Quantity maxim:<sup>1</sup>

These principles are usually explicated in the following schematic way. Note that they (as well as other principles below) are divided up between speaker and addressee:

- [2] Speaker: Do not say less than is required (bearing the I-principle in mind).  
Addressee: What is not said is not the case. (Huang 2007: 41)

The Quantity maxim is subdivided into those based on scalar implicatures and on clausal implicatures. We turn to each of these now.

#### 3.2.1.1. Based on Horn-scale (Horn's Q-principle), or $Q_{\text{-scalar}}$ implicatures?

Scalar implicatures take the general form

- [3]  $Q_{\text{-scalar}} : \langle x, y \rangle$   
 $y + > Q_{\text{-scalar}} \sim x$  (Huang 2007: 42)<sup>2</sup>

We see quite quickly that this kind of implicature cannot be responsible for the epistemic overtones of hearsay adverbs. If – on the basis of scalar assumptions mentioned after Ramat and Ricca (1998) in Wiemer and Socka (2017: Section 2.2) – we assume that the epistemic component (negative stance) constitutes a scale and  $x = \textit{allegedly}$  (*rzekomo*),  $y = \textit{reportedly}$  (*podobno*), then by using *reportedly*, the speaker implicates  $\sim \textit{allegedly}$ . Or, the other way round,  $x$  should entail  $y$ . With units of standard Horn-scales this allows one to say, e.g.

- (26) *The soup is not only warm, but hot.*  
*She's not just good, she's excellent.*  
*That's not only bad, but disastrous.*

<sup>1</sup>  $Q_{\text{-alternate}}$  implicatures are not considered here as they seem to us to be of minor (if any) importance to the present issue. In some regards,  $Q_{\text{-alternate}}$  implicatures show resemblance to M-implicatures, which likewise do not appear very helpful in understanding what is going on with “our case” (see 3.2.3). The main difference between  $Q_{\text{ordered alternate}}$  and  $Q_{\text{clausal}}$  implicatures is that, in the former, no entailment between the elements of the set holds true (cf. Huang 2007: 44).

<sup>2</sup> A Horn-scale  $\langle x, y \rangle$  consists of an informationally weaker element  $y$  and an informationally stronger element  $x$ , e.g.  $\langle \textit{identical}, \textit{similar} \rangle$ . Then the assertion of  $y$  implicates the negation of  $x$ .

We can hardly find an analogy with reportive sentence adverbs:

(27) \**He has broken his leg **not reportedly, but allegedly**.*

\**Złamał sobie nogę **nie podobno, tylko rzekomo**.*

Apart from the fact that such adverbs take scope over whole propositions (and that this property precludes them from being negated, unless metalinguistically, or being focused on), an entailment relation of epistemic strength with the item conveying a stronger negative commitment toward P (= x, *allegedly, rzekomo*) and entailing the weaker one (= y, *reportedly, podobno*) is inappropriate from the communicative point of view. For, by uttering (27), a speaker would practically be conveying: ‘P, and this is not hearsay and I’m not committed to its truth, but it’s hearsay and I do not trust it’. Beside the issue of entailment, what is disturbing here is the common and non-cancelable reportive component of both adverbs: it obviously dominates over the epistemic element, and there is no sense in repeating this common reference to the kind of source of information. This would, however, be inevitable if we would use both adverbs in an order convenient to making an entailment explicit.

See also the inverse order, by which we could strengthen an implicature:

(28) \**Złamał sobie nogę podobno, **a nawet rzekomo**.*

‘He has broken his leg *podobno*, **in fact rzekomo**.’

≈ \**He apparently / reportedly has broken his leg, **in fact allegedly**.*

If *rzekomo* really entailed *podobno* and both items could be arranged according to a Horn-scale, such an utterance should not be deviant (compare: *He has three children, in fact four*).

Furthermore, empirical observations show that *podobno* (= y) does not exclude P being false (it simply says that the speaker is ‘agnostic’ in this respect); and, in turn, the negative epistemic stance implicated by *rzekomo* (= x) does not always hold true (see Wiemer and Socka 2017: Section 2.2). Such an observation would be impossible with items arranged on a typical Horn-scale, which (as all principles based on the Quantity maxim) induce an upper-bounding implicature:

[4] A speaker, in saying ‘... p ...’, conversationally implicates that (for all he or she knows) ‘... **at most p** ...’

### 3.2.1.2. Based on clausal implicature?

This sort of Quantity-based implicature is usually formalized in the following way:

[5]  $Q_{\text{clausal}}: \langle X(p), Y(p) \rangle$   
 $Y(p) \rightarrow Q_{\text{clausal}} p, \sim p$  (Huang 2007: 42)

It is tempting to explain the relation between evidential adverbs like Pol. *podobno*, *jakoby* and *rzekomo* on the basis of clausal implicatures since, originally, these have been formulated as inferences of epistemic uncertainty. Compare two of the typical examples given by Levinson (2007: 136) and Huang (2007: 43) respectively:

(29) *I know that John is away.* (= X(p))

(30) *I believe that John is away.* (= Y(p))

(31a) <necessarily *p*, possibly *p*>

(31b) *It's possible that Buddhism is the world's oldest living religion.*

(31c) +> 'It's possible that Buddhism is the world's oldest living religion, and it's possible that Buddhism isn't the world's oldest living religion.' – or:

(31c') +> 'It's not necessarily the case that Buddhism is the world's oldest living religion.'

By analogy, applied to “our” reportive adverbs, we should expect that using the unit whose negative epistemic default is weaker (i.e. easier to defeat) implies that it was not intended to bring about this negative assessment (or: that the speaker wanted to remain ‘epistemically agnostic’). That is, by saying (32a), we would imply (32b):

(32a) *Podobno P.*

(32b) +> ‘... It's possible that P is true, and it's possible that P isn't true.’<sup>3</sup>

This observation is in agreement with the assumption (formulated according to Ramat and Ricca 1998 in Wiemer and Socka 2017: Section 2.2.1) that, if within a pair (or set) of reportive adverbs a member is neutral (‘agnostic’) with respect to epistemic judgment, this potential epistemic load equals more or less 50% on the epistemic scale. The problem, however, is why *podobno* should be ascribed the status of the marked member. There is no semantic (or common sense) reason to regard either of these two (or *jakoby*) as marked or unmarked in terms of intralingual (or paradigmatic) opposition. Leaving aside preferences of register or style, neither *rzekomo*, nor *podobno* can be regarded as preferred, in many cases they are even mutually substitutable (see Wiemer and Socka 2017: Section 2.2). After all, we are not sure whether this does not hold true for pairs like Engl. *allegedly* vs. *reportedly* (and *apparently* etc.) as well.

<sup>3</sup> Actually, this paraphrase can easily be introduced into Wierzbicka-like explications used in Wiemer (2006). Obviously, the reasoning which led to these explications were implicitly guided by  $Q_{\text{-clausal}}$ -implicatures.

Another, probably connected, problem arising with GCIs based on clausal implicatures is that the relation between *know* and *believe* is one between a (semi-)factive and a non-factive verb, whereas both *rzekomo* and *podobno* modify propositions to the extent that their factivity is suspended. That is why *rzekomo* would lead to the same formulation in the implicature which has been given in (32b). Finally, the application of  $Q_{\text{-clausal}}$ -implicatures hinges on the assumption that *rzekomo* is endowed with a stronger default of negative epistemic stance in every kind of context. This assumption, however, has proven to not be tenable, as has been shown by the ability for this default to be defeated, even with *rzekomo* and given specific communicative conditions (see Wiemer and Socka 2017: Section 2.2.2).

### 3.2.2. Based on the I(nformativeness)-Principle?

The I-principle is normally given the general form

- [6] I-scale : [x, y]  
 $y \rightarrow I x$  (Huang 2007: 47)

Again, if paraphrased, this schema has to be given differently for speaker and addressee:

- [7] Speaker: Do not say more than is required (bearing the Q-principle in mind).  
 Addressee: What is generally said is stereotypically and specifically exemplified.  
 (Huang 2007: 46)

Thus:

- [8] A speaker in saying ‘... *p* ...’ conversationally implicates that (for all he or she knows)  
 ‘... **more than** *p* ...’ (vs. [4])

Standard examples to illustrate how this works with natural language utterances are the following ones (cf. Huang 2007: 46):

- (33a) *p* and *q*  $\rightarrow$  *p* and then *q* / therefore *q*

- (33b) *John pressed the spring and* ( $\rightarrow$  then) *the drawer opened* / *and* ( $\rightarrow$  thereby) *caused the drawer to open*.

- (34a) frame-based inference

- (34b) *Mary pushed the cart to the checkout*.  
 $\rightarrow$  Mary pushed the cart full of groceries to the supermarket checkout in order to pay for them (and so on).

The Q- and the I-Principle are sort of antagonists: contrary to the Q-Principle, the I-Principle assumes a lower-bounding implicature. Thus, the most important difference between Q- and I-implicatures is that, while Q-implicatures

exclude a stronger element (function, meaning) that is **not meant**, I-implicatures enrich the utterance toward some stronger (more specific) information that was **not stated**. Thus, I-implicatures typically arise from stereotypical assumptions.

It is this property which makes it attractive to regard the relation between the German and Polish ALLEGEDLY-units as an instance of I-based implicatures. This type of implicature also has the advantage (in comparison to Q-based implicatures) of not needing to operate on a **set** (and, therefore, a potential paradigmatic contrast) of items. Thus, we may also investigate Pol. *podobno, ponoć, jakoby, podobno* independently from each other, as we can investigate Germ. *angeblich* which, as a reportive marker, obviously has no good “counterpart” on an epistemic scale (i.e. it does not build a widespread contrast with other reportive sentence adverbs).

Thus, the I-principle seems to be a good tool to capture the often observed implicature of negative epistemic stance (doubt) arising from reportive markers. The usual way to explain this implicature (‘hearsay +> speaker is uncertain as for whether *P* obtains, or has obtained’) is by arguing as follows: if the speaker refers to previous utterances made by other people (another person), the speaker does not subscribe to the truth of the propositional content of these utterances being referred to. In other words: it is easy to turn epistemic agnosticism into epistemic reservation (scepticism) or even a downright refusal of *P* being true. Inherent to this kind of reasoning is an enrichment of what is said. What is lexically conveyed by all sentence adverbs considered here is a reportive, thus an evidential, value; all the time the question is as to what extent and due to which mechanism these units also convey the speaker’s epistemic judgment concerning *P*. This provided, we are able to view the reportive value as referring to what is explicitly said, while the epistemic judgment results from an enrichment of what is explicitly said.

We will return to this point below, after examining the M-principle.

### 3.2.3. Based on the M(anner)-Principle?

The M-Principle usually takes on the following form:

- [9] M-scale : {*x*, *y*}  
                   *y* +> M ~*x* (Huang 2007: 51)

- [10] Speaker: Do not use a marked expression without reason.  
           Addressee: What is said in a marked way is not unmarked. (Huang 2007: 50)

One might wonder whether this principle can really apply to “our case”. Consider its characterization by Huang (2007: 51):



Unlike the Q- and I-principles, which operate primarily in terms of semantic informativeness, the metalinguistic M-principle operates primarily in terms of a set of alternates that contrast in form. The fundamental axiom upon which this principle rests is that the use of a marked expression M-implicates the negation of the interpretation associated with the use of an alternative, unmarked expression in the same set. Putting it another way, from the use of a marked linguistic expression, one infers that the stereotypical interpretation associated with the use of an alternative, unmarked linguistic expression does not obtain (...).

Here is one of Huang's examples (2007: 51):

(35a) *John stopped the car.*

+> John stopped the car in the usual manner.

(35b) *John caused the car to stop.*

+> John stopped the car in an unusual way, for example, by bumping into a wall.

At first sight, there are a couple of considerations that might speak against the M-principle being a viable tool for capturing the relationship between reportive sentence adverbs. Basically, these considerations apply as long as we consider paradigmatic relations just between lexical items (i.e. the reportive sentence adverbs under study):

- a) Like Q-Principles, the M-principle assumes an (at last implicit) set of alternates. Thus, it would be difficult to apply it to cases like Germ. *angeblich*, which does not stand in a reasonably frequent opposition to another reportive adverb.
- b) The M-principle builds on expressions which are always marked (and thus produce an implicit contrast with unmarked, or expected, expressions), i.e. the expression triggering the implicature is marked *per se* (in the given contextual or situational surrounding). However, none of the reportive adverbs we have been examining can be considered as being so marked, or unexpected. Typically, if there is a choice between at least two adverbs – as in Polish or English – the epistemically stronger one seems to be the unmarked one (see Figure 2; see Wiemer and Socka 2017: 2.2.1).
- c) As stated by Huang (see above), the M-principle primarily operates on a contrast **in form**. Usually this manifests itself in the addition of an affix or otherwise longer expressions (double negation, complex predicates, etc.). No such relation holds true between “our” reportive adverbs.

However, we may object that the very use of a reportive adverb (particularly in languages for which there are no obligatory evidentials) creates a contrast with an unmodified declarative sentence (in the indicative). If we start considering the relation not between alternatives of lexical items (or morphemes) able to occupy slots (in word forms or clause structure), but rather between whole utterances (each endowed with propositional content), things

look different. A pair of simple sentences like (36a–b) for Polish, which differ only with respect to the absence vs. presence of a reportive adverb, acquires a contrast comparable to the contrast in the textbook example (35a–b):

(36a) *Nie przyszedłeś na ostatnie zebranie.*

‘You didn’t come to the last meeting.’

(36b) *Podobno / rzekomo nie przyszedłeś na ostatnie zebranie.*

‘Reportedly / Allegedly, you didn’t come to the last meeting.’

Such a contrast was also inherent to the test for dissent adduced in Wiemer and Socka (2017: Section 2.2.1; ex. 2–3). Crucially, the additional reportive adverb introduced into (36b), insofar as interlocutors need not expect it, is communicatively marked, or rather: it adds to the utterance which it modifies a reportive metacomment. This, in turn, supplies a trigger to evoke an I-implicature, i.e. to make the addressee infer that the speaker might have meant something more than they actually said (“Why did the speaker not just utter an indicative statement without a modifier?”). By using *podobno* etc., the speaker did say that the proposition is “valid” on the basis of hearsay, but the inferred “surplus value” makes the addressee inclined to impute more. This inference might be stronger (or: more natural), the less stereotypical an utterance with *podobno*, *rzekomo* etc. is in the given speech community and under the specific type of contextual/situational conditions. Therefore, we would not like to entirely dismiss the M-principle as a sensible cue for explaining epistemic overtones as a GCI with hearsay adverbs. In a sense, it may even conspire with the I-principle.

### 3.3. Trying to gather the harvest

We are, therefore, left with the following question: What kind of implicature is the most appropriate one to capture the nature of the relationship between reportive adverbs (in intralingual comparison): clausal Q-implicature, I-implicature, or, after all, M-implicature? Or is it a combination of two, or even of all three of them?

In 3.2.1.2, we hinted at problems that would arise if we based GCI only on a Q-clause-mechanism. The GCI appears to be explained better if it is based on the I-principle; the advantages of assuming this have been argued for in 3.2.2. But note that each of these principles is formulated separately: either from the perspective of the speaker, or from the point of view of the addressee. Here we repeat their explication for convenience:

Based on the Quantity Principle

[2] Speaker: Do not say less than is required (bearing the I-principle in mind).

Addressee: What is not said is not the case.

Based on the Informativeness Principle

[7] Speaker: Do not say more than is required (bearing the Q-principle in mind).

Addressee: What is generally said is stereotypically and specifically exemplified.

As we showed in 3.2.3, the I-based assumption of the addressee may, in turn, be triggered by an M-implicature. Thus, I- and M-implicatures may work together, as though creating a domino effect.

We should take into consideration that Q- and I-based or M-based principles might also combine, but the speaker and addressee differ as to which of the two they “choose.” Provided the speaker abides by the Q-based principle, they are thereby anxious not to leave out an indication of hearsay as the source of information (the speaker, as it were, wishes to be “honest” by “being accurate”). On the contrary, the addressee might process the perceived utterance by applying “their” part of the I- or M-principle. Instead of being restrictive concerning the meaning potential of the utterance, the addressee enriches it, relying on the usual associations connected to hearsay. In other words: the addressee might impute something (namely: epistemic reservation) into the speaker’s message which they had not intended to be implicated (or which they might even have wished to avoid).

This reasoning – if it proves correct – implies at least three things: (i) I-implicatures acquire key significance since they serve as a kind of bridging element between Q- and M-implicatures; (ii) the relation between reportive meaning and epistemic implicature can, as it were, be (unconsciously) negotiated; (iii) in actual discourse, epistemic overtones might arise via a communicative (i.e. illocutionary) mismatch between the interlocutors. In any way, it can fluctuate and is subject to subtle “misinterpretations”: it is possible that the addressee interprets the utterance in another way than was intended by the speaker because the addressee relies on a pragmatic principle that is in conflict with an antagonistic principle.

Let us finish this section by trying to answer the question of why it is texts (discourse) potentially bearing legal consequences (news reports etc.) in which epistemic overtones implicated by virtue of GCI are often canceled (as is usually the case, first of all, with Pol. *rzekomo*, or Germ. *angeblich* and *mutmaßlich*). It seems that the answer can be derived from the ‘Implicature cancelation procedure’ first formulated in Gazdar (1979) and afterwards adapted by Huang (2007: 54), who we cite for the hierarchy of factors given in [11]:<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Metalinguistic negation (which is not always applicable) should be added as another factor somewhere in the upper section of the hierarchy.

- [11] Implicature cancelation procedure
  - (a) background assumptions
  - (b) contextual factors
  - (c) semantic entailments
  - (d) conversational implicatures
    - (i) Q-implicatures
      - (1) Q<sub>-clausal</sub> implicatures
      - (2) Q<sub>-scalar</sub> implicatures
    - (ii) M-implicatures
    - (iii) I-implicatures

This set of conditions has to be read as an implicational hierarchy: every factor that is lower on the hierarchy is weaker than the factors above it. I-implicatures are the weakest kind of inferential trigger and can be overridden most easily, while background assumptions (world knowledge etc.) are the strongest factor and can hardly be abandoned by any other condition in natural discourse. Thus, given a GCI (i.e. its result in the interpretation of a linguistic unit or utterance) that rests on an I-implicature, it will be canceled by an M-implicature, and so on.

Now, knowledge about possible legal consequences of an assertion in a news report belongs to the background knowledge of the journalist (and probably their readers, too), as does knowledge about the significance and function of different text genres. In light of Gazdar's hierarchy, it is not surprising that this kind of knowledge outrules the normal GCI carried by the investigated ALLEGEDLY-units, regardless of their purported "strength" of epistemic reservation.

Curiously, the kinds of implicature which have turned out to be the best candidates capable of explaining the GCI of epistemic commitment triggered by reportive adverbs occupy the lowest, i.e. weakest places in Gazdar's hierarchy. This observation might be helpful in explaining why epistemic implicatures evoked by reportive adverbs are so vulnerable and, thus, prone to diachronic change: they may become conventionalized, they may vanish, or they may just "hover" all the time as GCIs. Together with imaginable misunderstandings occurring on a communicative micro-level, which we considered above, the weak force of the I- and the M-Principle might be used as "neuralgic spots" to capture the differences of meaning potential between otherwise equivalent hearsay markers and the reasons of their change into (reportive) evidentiality (and, maybe, out of it).

This suggestion leads us to the next section.

## 4. Consequences for crosslinguistic studies and lexicography

We have now arrived at a stage in which we can take up one of Aikhenvald's observations concerning the pragmatic potential of evidential markers or equivalent means of information source: "(...) in many languages, speech reports acquire epistemic overtones. Saying 'He says he is a doctor' may be meant to cast doubt over his qualifications. In some languages, speech reports are used to transmit something one does not really believe. These connotations are far from universal—they have not been attested in Hinuq, Tatar, or Saaroa" (Aikhenvald 2014: 26). Epistemic implicatures have been attested for markers of evidentiality (or information source) regardless of their grammatical or lexical status. On the one hand, "[s]peakers of any language can express the information source lexically if they need to. But such lexical explanations may produce additional illocutionary effects", such as distrust (Aikhenvald 2004: 338). This also applies to diverse means acknowledged by Aikhenvald as 'evidential strategies'. As for grammatical evidentials, in turn, "the reported evidential in Tariana has connotations of 'unreliability' and distancing oneself from the source" (Aikhenvald 2004: 352) as well. On the other hand, there are plentiful examples in different parts of the world demonstrating that grammatical evidentials do not trigger any epistemic implicatures (Aikhenvald 2004, *passim*, among others), and our analysis of reportive sentence adverbs in two European languages has, as we hope, shown that epistemic implicatures are not necessarily an "ingredient" to the meaning of such lexical markers of information source, either, or at least that such implicatures can easily be canceled. Furthermore, Aikhenvald (2004: ch. 10–11) has convincingly shown that an appropriate usage of evidential markers to a large extent depends on cultural conventions, in particular on a knowledge of social relations and discourse genres (see especially p. 344). Note that these kinds of factors rank highest on Gazdar's hierarchy in [11] ('background assumptions', 'contextual factors').

It is also these two types of factors that seem to rank highest in the use (vs. avoidance) of Bulgarian verbal non-firsthand forms (Bulg. *preizkazni forme*); they represent another evidential strategy, but are based on grammatical paradigms. These forms cannot be ascribed an inherent epistemic component, either; overtones of distrust can be explained on the basis of a GCI, too. However, contrary to the German and Polish ALLEGEDLY-units, the Bulgarian forms are avoided in contexts of juridical responsibility and whenever the author does not want to appear unbelievable, while they are frequently used in all sorts of argumentative discourse when the speaker/writer polemicalizes with an opponent's views. Apart from that, they occur in true *re*-narration and the relation of historical facts; cf. Wiemer and Kampf (2012 [2015]: 23–26, 33f.), where it was argued that seemingly contradictory facts about the usage

of Bulgarian non-firsthand forms can be given a coherent explanation only provided we assume that these forms are by themselves epistemically neutral, and that it is exactly because of their non-committal character that they lend themselves to context-conditioned implicatures triggered, or inhibited, on the basis of “macro-illocutionary” purposes (set, among others, by institutional frames or discourse genres), i.e., again, by factors occupying high positions in Gazdar’s hierarchy.

Against this background, let us return to the claim that conversational implicatures tend to be universal, whereas conventional ones tend not to be universal (see 3.1). It raises the (rather anthropological) question of how culture-independent conversational implicatures actually are, in particular when it comes to the meaning (or use) of reportive sentence adverbs (or other propositional modifiers). This issue, in turn, bears on linguistic practice, both in considerations on the semantics-pragmatics interface and in lexicography. Namely, our analysis in section 2 in Wiemer and Socka (2017) and in section 3 here led to the exclusion of an inherent epistemic component in, for instance, Germ. *angeblich* or Pol. *rzekomo* and *jakoby*. This component can be predicted due to a GCI. Since this implicature is generalized, we can, for reasons of economy, skip it in a semantic, or lexicographic, account of the respective hearsay markers; speakers presumably calculate it on the basis of usual assumptions regarding “how communication goes” (in their community). However, if such usual assumptions prove to not be universal, we can apply the economy principle at best for the description of reportive sentence adverbs of individual languages (like Polish or German and probably most, if not all, European languages), but should refrain from it in a global, crosslinguistic comparison. We would, then, again have to stipulate it in the description of each reportive sentence adverb of a particular language, or it has to be specified for each language *in toto* that, by default, this GCI works with its reportive sentence adverbs (or particles, for that matter) so that we can dispense with an indication of epistemic components in the description of individual lexical items in that, but only for that, language.

Apart from this, the relation between evidential and epistemic components in reportive markers can underlie diachronic change and, correspondingly, may differ even for cognate units of closely related languages. For instance, what happens to be best characterized as a GCI in a Polish lexeme, can turn out to be a conventionalized (non-cancelable) part of meaning in an etymologically related item in Russian. This is exactly what can be demonstrated by a comparison of Pol. *jakoby* with Russ. *jākoby* (*à* indicates stress). In contemporary Russian, *jakoby* is a reportive marker which carries an epistemic overtone of doubt about the reported P that, contrary to its Polish cognate, cannot be defeated. Together with this, the epistemic component differs, insofar as the degree of conviction that the reported P does not hold is stronger. In fact, it amounts to rejection of the reported P. See Rakhilina (1996) and Plungjan (2008: 305), who

proposed the following periphrasis to approximate this component of *jakoby*'s meaning (in addition to reference to hearsay; translation ours):

[12] 'Some people think that P is true; I don't think so.'

Compare but one typical example:

- (37) *Nikolaev i Golubovič obvinjalis' v tom, čto oni jakoby nanesli neskol'ko udarov drevkom flaga sotrudniku milicii. Pri takix xarakterizujuščix dannyx (...) nikogo i nikogda ne arestovyvajut i ne sažajut. Zdes' že Tverskoj sud Moskvy dal im po tri goda lišenija svobody! Éto pri tom, čto u poterpevshego milicionera edinstvennym posledstviem „izbienija“ bylo povyšenie po službe.* (NKRJa; Andrej Andreev: "Buduščee prinadležit nam!" (2003) // «Zavtra», 2003.08.22)

'Nikolaev and Golubovič were accused of {*jakoby*} having beaten up a representative of the police by hitting him several times with a flag shaft. For such actions nobody had ever been arrested, nor put in prison. But the court of the Tverskoj district in Moscow sentenced each of them to three years in prison! All this is especially strange given the fact that, for the victim, the only consequence of being "beaten up" was his promotion in service.'

We have not come across any examples showing (nor assertions in research literature claiming) that component [12] could be canceled. We can, thus, safely assume that the epistemic component does not just result from a GCI, but is – together with the hearsay reference – a stable (i.e. coded) element of this unit's meaning.

In Wiemer and Socka (2017: Section 2.2.2), we noticed that Polish ALLEGEDLY-units differ in subtle ways that certainly reflect differences on deeper levels of their meaning structure. We also noted that specialists appear to be unanimous as to where these differences are located. A salient case in point is Pol. *ponoć*, which comes close to Pol. *jakoby* in argumentative discourse and (for this reason?) is considered by some specialists to imply a non-cancelable element of doubt. The reasons for such individual behavior of these reportive adverbs certainly reside in additional components of their meaning potential, which are often absent in evidential markers of a more grammatical nature. These additional meaning components have not been "stripped down" in the adverbs, but if we abstract away from individual features we can, nonetheless, arrange these adverbs on a gradient of epistemic strength (as in Figure 3; see Wiemer and Socka 2017: 2.2.2), and we should try to distinguish for which of them the epistemic component is coded, and for which it is inferred. This holds true for both intra- and interlingual comparison. What unites them is their common reportive core.

Let us finish with a brief comparison of Basque *omen*, which is classified as a particle in Alcázar (2010) and Korta and Zubeldia (2014), but otherwise shows striking similarities with Polish and German ALLEGEDLY-units. *Omen* demonstrates the same behavior in a test of dissent as was applied in section 2 in

Wiemer and Socka (2017) and in section 3 here. *Omen*, however, is more “liberal” under the scope of sentential negation, insofar as a clause modified by *omen* can function as a complement of a negated predicate higher in the constituent structure; see Korta and Zubeldia’s example (their ex. 24, their translation):

- (38) *Ez da egia euri-a ari omen*  
 NEG be.3SG.ABS.PRS true.DET.SG rain-DET.SG.ABS PROG HS  
*d-u-ela.*  
 3SG.ABS.PRS-have-COMP  
 ‘It is not true that **it is stated that** it is raining.’<sup>5</sup>

Korta and Zubeldia show the same effect arising after some epistemic complement-taking predicates (CTPs) and subsume these findings: “the evidential content can be dissented with, as far as the participants’ intuitions are concerned, and (...) the evidential content gets narrow scope within some operators” (Korta and Zubeldia 2014: 405). The Polish and German ALLEGEDLY-units at least cannot be used in clausal arguments of negated CTPs related to cognition or epistemic attitudes (as in ex. 38 for Basque); see (39a, 40a). They also cannot occur (or sound utterly weird) even under non-negated cognitive/epistemic CTPs (unless uttered as a rhetoric question); see (39b, 40b).

#### Polish

- (39a) \**Nieprawda, że Piotr podobno/rzekomo/jakoby stracił pracę.*  
 ‘It’s not true that Peter {hs} has lost his work.’

- (39b) ??*Prawda, że Piotr podobno / rzekomo/jakoby stracił pracę.*  
 ‘It’s true that Peter {hs} has lost his work.’

#### German

- (40a) \**Es stimmt nicht, daß Peter angeblich seine Arbeit verloren hat.*  
 ‘It’s not true that Peter {hs} has lost his work.’

- (40b) ??*Es stimmt, daß Peter angeblich seine Arbeit verloren hat.*  
 ‘It’s true that Peter {hs} has lost his work.’

Thus, not all tests applied by Korta and Zubeldia lead to identical results in different languages. Scope tests as means of crosslinguistic comparison require a thorough check and clarification.

Regardless of this caveat, according to Korta and Zubeldia (2014: 417), *omen* also shares the property that it “admits any option between a fully determinate or specific original speaker and a fully indeterminate or nonspecific one”. We

<sup>5</sup> The authors explicitly stress that this “utterance must be interpreted as(25) and not as (26):  
 (25) It is not true that someone else stated that it is raining.

(26) Someone else stated that it is not true that it is raining” (Korta and Zubeldia 2014: 404)

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Grochowski et al. (2014: 107) for *podobno*.



are not sure whether this applies to German and Polish reportive adverbs, too. As we showed in Wiemer and Socka (2017: Section 2.2.2), the Polish units may differ in aptness to occur in an environment in which a specific original speaker is mentioned. More importantly, Korta and Zubeldia also conclude that, with *omen*, “the expression of uncertainty is a GCI.” However, they link it to the second maxim of Quality in its original formulation by Grice: ‘Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence’; it is “for this reason that the speaker produces an *omen*-utterance instead of an utterance without it” (Korta and Zubeldia 2014: 411f.). This attempt to explain the trigger for the GCI with a maxim of Quality somewhat surprises. Admittedly, by adding *omen* to an utterance with some propositional content *P*, the speaker lets the hearer know that asserting *P* does not rely on direct (or at least personal) experience, so this might be understood as a “lack of adequate evidence”, i.e. of evidence for which the speaker could vouch with full responsibility. However, adding *omen* to an utterance verbalising *P eo ipso* entails marking the utterance as containing something more than just the content of *P* plain and simple. In 3.2.3 and 3.3 we argued that such an addition can also be captured as evoking the Manner maxim, which, in turn, can raise an inference based on the I-Principle. At the very least, we can say that a quality maxim cannot be considered as an independent, or isolated, mechanism triggering the GCI of epistemic reservation.<sup>7</sup>

## 5. Conclusions

Let us summarize our discussion. We have dealt with implicatures that can be phrased like this:

(Imp1) ‘I say *P*, and *P* was / has been said by other people’ (hearsay) +> ‘I do not / cannot know whether *P* is true or not’ (epistemic agnosticism),

This attitude (let’s call it ‘epistemic distance’) often gives way to two different implicatures that bear on the epistemic assessment of *P*:

(Imp2) +> ‘I think that *P* can be not true’ (doubt),

---

<sup>7</sup> We should also realize that the Quality maxims have been considered (and probably rightly so) as superordinate creatures, in comparison to the rest of Grice’s maxims. According to Horn (2004: 7), “many (...) have accorded a privileged status to Quality, since without the observation of Quality, or (...) the convention of truthfulness, it is hard to see how any of the other maxims can be satisfied.” Although Aikhenvald (2004: passim, and elsewhere) repeatedly emphasized that evidential marking is not about truth, but rather about “being accurate” (as for source of information), speakers of respective languages can cheat by using the “wrong” markers (and then be regarded either as liars or as “incomprehensible” or dull people). This is tantamount to a violation of the second maxim of Quality. But by this violation, such speakers simultaneously fail to obey the I- and/or the M-Principle.

or stronger:

(Imp3) +> 'I don't think that *P* is true' (rejection).

The question is whether these implicatures, especially (Imp2) and (Imp3), are only pragmatically inferred or can lay claim to being stable ingredients of specific linguistic units. We hope to have shown that sentence adverbs with a common reportive component, i.e. a shared meaning as paraphrased in (Imp1), that is part of their coded meaning (= ALLEGEDLY-units) differ regarding the status of implicatures (Imp2) and (Imp3) in at least two respects:

1. Some ALLEGEDLY-units show implicature (Imp2), some show implicature (Imp3).
2. For either of these implicatures, the following applies: it can either remain pragmatically conditioned (inferred) or become a stable part of meaning (coded).

Further findings can be summarized as follows:

3. For all Polish and German ALLEGEDLY-units analyzed, the implicature (Imp2) or (Imp3), respectively, can best be characterized as a GCI, while Russ. *jākoby* has (Imp3) as a conventionalized part of its meaning. There is a continuum with the clear cases of Pol. *podobno* and Basque *omen* (implicature Imp2 as a GCI) and Russ. *jākoby* (implicature Imp3 not as a GCI, but as a coded part of its individual meaning) at its poles; the other units are situated somewhere in-between. See Figure 6 where this continuum is depicted with the aid of double-sided arrows and the placement of most of the units in the middle part between implicatures (Imp2) and (Imp3).
4. Epistemic agnosticism is a precondition for implicatures (Imp2) and (Imp3) to arise, and for them to be cancelable (in case they function like a GCI). We think that the relation between the reportive component and epistemic agnosticism is conceived of best as a communicative default.
5. As far as these implicatures are concerned, there is no difference in principle between grammatical evidentials and lexical markers of information source, or any kind of evidential strategy.
6. Contrary to grammatical evidentials (in particular, reportives), the semantics of ALLEGEDLY-units usually comprises additional, more idiosyncratic meaning components like, for instance, those related to origo-exclusiveness (see Wiemer and Socka 2017: Section 2.2.2). These make their conditions of usage more specific and contribute to their internal differentiation, among other things when it comes to interaction with various discourse genres, communicative situations and superordinate illocutionary goals (see below). From a lexicographic point of view, such individual meaning components should be accounted for in a more fine-grained description on deeper levels of semantic organization. See Figure 6, where the vertical arrows indicate the layering from more to less generalizable properties.

**CODED** in all units: reportive component  
 'I say *P*, and *P* was/has been said by other people.'

epistemic agnosticism (by default) +>  
 'I do not/cannot know whether *P* is true or not.'




Figure 6. Layered structure of the meaning of hearsay markers (common and individual components)

There is another conclusion relating to the pragmatic machinery:

7. Whatever maxim (or maxim combination) triggers the GCI (see 3.3), we should take into account potential communicative mismatches between the speaker's intention and the addressee's interpretation of the message containing the reportive marker. Such mismatches become possible on the basis of epistemic agnosticism (see conclusion 4. above): it can be exploited to give way either to a lower-bounding or to an upper-bounding implicature (I- vs. Q-Principle),<sup>8</sup> or the addressee implicates just on the basis of a marked form (M-Principle) that there is a "surplus" of meaning. However, an M-based implicature by itself implies a paradigmatic contrast (with an utterance without the additional modifier); it is, therefore, difficult to distinguish from an I-based implicature, and we cannot exclude that both work together.

Regardless, there is no reason to believe that such mismatches only occur with lexical markers of hearsay, they may also take place with grammatical evidentials. They might, however, differ as a consequence of the degree of expectability and, thus, of paradigmatic contrast between an evidentially marked vs. unmarked utterance: grammatical markers are, in general, more frequent and, as a consequence, tend to be more expectable than their lexical source

<sup>8</sup> See Faller (2012), who claims that by using reportive items the speaker induces the scalar implicature that s/he does not have direct evidence for the proposition expressed.

expressions (or equivalents), up to becoming obligatory. Increase of expectability lowers markedness (given the right communicative circumstances and rational behavior of the interlocutors). It remains to be investigated whether, for ALLEGEDLY-units, or other lexical markers of information source, expectability is enhanced (and markedness, thus, lowered) in specific types of contexts (in particular, text genres) in a similar manner as with grammatical evidentials, and if this might be an explanation for their epistemic overtones that, in turn, can be suppressed under individual circumstances. What is needed for a check of such assumptions is a reliable and objectified measure of expectability.

At present, we feel unable to make a decision about what exactly triggers the GCI behind the implicature (Imp2) and (Imp3): some maxim of Quality, the I-Principle, the M-Principle, or any combination of them? But whatever the solution may be, if GCIs can be shown to be triggered by principles used in post-Gricean (in particular, Neo-Gricean) frameworks, these are principles working on a micro-communicative level. They can easily be overridden by stronger factors like those occupying the three upper levels in Gazdar's 'Implicature cancellation procedure' (see 3.3). For this reason, and finally, let us stress that, if we want to capture the meaning potential of expressions used for indicating information source from a usage-based perspective, one has to account for higher-order routines rooted in attitudes to communicative situations and cultural background, including knowledge about discourse genres. To these, we have to add some more factors pointed out in Aikhenvald's (2004: 331) hierarchy. However, this line of reasoning could not be pursued further in this paper. Let us be reminded that the question of whether GCIs can be considered to be universal remains an open issue. If they are not, the whole endeavor of crosslinguistic comparison of the relation between evidential and epistemic components in the semantics of markers of information source – be they grammatical or lexical – gets much more complicated.

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